

A 1490. p. 134.
L E T T E R

T O A

M E M B E R

O F T H E

O C T O B E R - C L U B :

S H E W I N G,

That to yield *Spain* to the Duke
of *Anjou* by a Peace, wou'd be
the Ruin of *Great Britain*.

The Second Edition, with Additions.

Et nomen Pacis dulce est, & ipsa res salutaris; sed
inter Pacem & Servitutem plurimum distat: Pax
est tranquilla Libertas, Servitus postremum omni-
um Malorum, non modo bello sed etiam morte re-
pellendum. Cic. 2 Philip.

L O N D O N;

Printed for A. Baldwin near the Oxford-Arms in
Warwick-Lane. 1711. Price 6 d.

21 F 32



The TABLE.

T HE Introduction, or a Comparison of our little Hopes at the Beginning, with our great Successes in the Progress of the present War.	pag. 1, 2
The Design, or Subject of the Letter.	3, 4
That giving Spain to the Duke of Anjou by a Peace, is giving it to the French King, prov'd by several other Arguments; as also that the French King will be ruin'd if Spain shou'd not be left in his power by a Peace.	4—8
The French King will assure himself of the Fidelity of all the Spaniards, both Nobles and Common People, and by what Methods; and that yielding Cadiz to us will not hinder him.	8, 9, 10
Consequently he will be in no danger of future Invasions from that side.	8, 12
He will effectually prevent the Exportation of Spanish Wool from his Dominions.	10
The French King by having Spain will vastly increase his own and his Subjects Riches, by drawing all the Bullion of the Spanish-Indies (whence all Europe is chiefly supply'd) into his own Dominions, and suffering none to be carry'd out.	10, 11
The French King's Increase of Power, a necessary Consequence of his Increase of Riches and Security.	11, 12
The French King by having Spain will distress his Neighbours, especially the two Maritime Powers;	
By depriving them of their whole Mediterranean Trade.	12
By preventing their Returns of raw Silks from the Levant.	
12. And of unwrought Wool from Spain, for the Employment and Subsistence of their Subjects. 10. An Essay towards shewing what Numbers will be depriv'd of their Employment and Subsistence, by the Loss of the Mediterranean Trade.	13
By prohibiting the Importation of their Manufactures into his Countrys.	13
The French King by having Spain will impoverish his Neighbours, by depriving them of their annual Supplies of Bullion from Spain and the Spanish-Indies. 14. and from Portugal and Brazil.	

15. and by forcing them to pay for Necessarys out of their present Stock of Bullion. 14. and by allowing his own Subjects to sell us Luxury for Money. 14
- October-Men better Patriots than Promoters of a French Wine-Trade.* 14
- Our Weakness a necessary Consequence of our Distress and Poverty.* 14
14. Will soon oblige us to submit to such a Prince and Religion as France won'd impose upon us. 14
- After Spain shall be given up, Portugal will not hold out against the united Kingdoms above one Campaign.* 15
- The French King will govern Portugal so as shall best conduce to the Increase of his own Security, Riches and Power, and to distress, impoverish, and weaken his Neighbours.* 15
- All the Returns from Brazile will be laid up in France, and no other Nation will be let in for any Share of those Riches.* 15
- All the Riches of Peru, Mexico, and Brazile, which alone furnish all Europe with Money, will be bury'd in France, and we shall have no more Supplies from those Places.* 15
- Those Colonys will not separate themselves from the Jurisdiction of their Mother-Countrys, nor open their Ports to other Merchants.* 15, 16
- We shall not be able to make a Conquest of those Countrys.* 16
- We shall not be able to intercept their Plate Fleets.* 16
- We shall not be able to trade with those Colonys, or draw any Money from them.* 17
- We shall not be able to get any Money from those Colonys, by having Forts in the South-Sea.* 16, 17
- We shall lose the most valuable Branch of our African Trade, viz. That which serves the Spaniards with Negroes, and makes Returns of Bullion.* 17
- By yielding Spain to the Duke of Anjou, and its Consequences, we shall lose all our annual Incomes or Supplies of Money from abroad.* 18, 19, 20
- Our present annual Income is three Millions and a half by foreign Trade.* 20, 21, 22
- Consequently by yielding Spain, &c. we shall lose the annual Income of three Millions and a half.* 22, 23
- And as our Returns wou'd be a Million more by Peace and King Charles upon the Spanish Throne, our Loss by yielding Spain, &c. wou'd be four Millions and a half.* 23
- By yielding Spain to the Duke of Anjou, we shall lose half a Million of our present Stock yearly, till the whole shall be gone.* 23, 24
- Tho we should save our whole Expence Abroad to the present War.* 23
- Tho we should give over our Trade to the East-Indies.* 23, 24
- Tho we should send less Money to the East-Country for Naval Stores,*

Stores, after the Loss of our East-India, Mediterranean, African, and a great part of our West-India Trades. 24

Yet for Naval Stores and Luxury we should still export half a Million per ann. 24, 25

The Peace desir'd by some Men worse than the present War by one Million per ann. and than the Peace we fight for by four Millions per ann. 25

Whosoever would advise the giving up Spain for a Peace, and the Advantages of a South-Sea Trade, or the certain Income of three Millions and a half per ann. for the Hopes of uncertain Profit by that Trade, no good Patriot. 25, 26

If we shall be able to return no more Money from Abroad, we shall lose our Markets for Goods of the Value of three Millions and a Half. 26, 27

Of all Goods exported and sold Abroad, six seventh Parts are English Labour. 26, 27

Consequently the Loss of foreign Markets for our Goods, of the Value of three Millions and a half, will be the Loss of our Markets for English Labour of the Value of three Millions. 27

We shall therefore lose Employment and Subsistence for as many People as are yearly maintain'd at the Charge of three Millions, that is, for half a Million of People, by the Loss of Spain. 27, 28

We shall also lose Employment and Subsistence for as many People by the Want of unwrought Wool from Spain, Raw-Silk from the Levant and the East-Indies, by degenerating into coarser Manufactures, and growing better Husbands of our Clothes. 28, 29

Eminent Traders, with a whole Million of Poor, must come upon the Parish-Rates. 29

The Examiner against Trade, and why. 29

Hard to conceive for what Reasons some Clergymen are against Trade, 29, 30

Whosoever should promote the giving Spain and the Trade of England for Peace, ought to be impeach'd by the general Voice of the Kingdom. 30

By the Loss of Spain, and so much of our Trade, Gentlemen must lose three fourth Parts of the Value of their whole Estates. 30, 31, 32

An Example of a Country where Estates fell three Quarters of their whole Value, by only part of the Mischief which would befall England by the yielding up of Spain. 31, 32

Gentlemen who are indebted in one fourth Part of the Value of their Estates, would lose the whole by such a Peace, 32

The Misery of Gentlemen and Ladies who must come upon the Parish for Subsistence. 32

Why

<i>Why a late Parliament address'd against Peace without the Refi- tution of Spain,</i>	33
<i>The Examiner against that Parliament and their Address.</i>	33,
	34
<i>Expostulations with the Examiner; and that Parliament justi- fy'd.</i>	35
<i>The Examiner would ruin the Kingdom by a Peace.</i>	36
<i>The Examiner's Invektives against the Old M——rs, equally true against the New.</i>	ib.
<i>The new M——rs justly applauded, without any Derogation from the Merits of the Old.</i>	37
<i>Expostulations with those of the Clergy, the Gentlemen and com- mon People, who are so very impatient for a Peace.</i>	37 & usq; ad finem.
<i>Jacobites as well as others would be ruin'd, by yielding up Spain to the Duke of Anjou.</i>	39
<i>The Interest of all Orders and Degrees of People to contribute to the War till Spain shall be recover'd.</i>	41
<i>The Ballance of Power lost if Spain shou'd be given to the Duke of Anjou, or if the whole Spanish Monarchy shou'd not be recover'd to the Emperor.</i>	41, 42



A

LETTER

TO A

MEMBER of the *October-Club, &c.*

SIR,

NINE or ten Years ago I cou'd not but observe, *The Intro-*
as a thing very remarkable, the general Dis- *duction, or*
position of *England* to enter into the War; I *Comparison*
am now more surpriz'd at the universal Impa- *of our small*
tience of all your Party for a Peace. *Hopes at*

When I look back to the Beginning of this War, and *the Begin-*
take a View of the State of *Europe* at that time; *ning with*
France against us, and by her own native Strength almost a Match *our great*
for all her Neighbours; the *Milaneze*, *Naples*, and the *Spanish* *Successes*
Netherlands in her possession; the whole *Spanish* Mo- *in the Pro-*
narchy at her disposal; the Dukes of *Savoy* and *Mantua* *gress of the*
assisting with the whole Forces of their Countrys to keep *War.*
all *Italy* in her Subjection; the Electors of *Bavaria* and
Cologne, with the Dukes of *Wolfenbuttle* and the *Hungarian*
Malecontents her Allies, embroiling the Empire, and
threatning the Imperial Dignity: to oppose this formida-
ble Enemy the whole Force being that of the Emperor,

with a Rebellion on each side of his exhausted *Countrys*; that of the *United Provinces* just ready to be overwhelm'd by Inundations of Armys from *France* and the *Spanish Netherlands*, and that of *England* divided by her Partys, and weary'd out by the former War; I say, when I consider this Conjuncture, I cannot but wonder that our Courage did not faint at the very Prospect; and surely nothing cou'd justify our undertaking this new War, but absolute Necessity, and the Apprehension of inevitable Ruin by Peace.

Again, When I remember the little Hopes we had at that time, I am astonish'd at our Successes, and present Acquisitions. The Duke of *Mantua* quite ruin'd; the Duke of *Savoy* brought over to our side; the *French* intirely driven out of *Italy*; and great Supplies drawn from hence against the common Enemy. The Dukes of *Wolfsenbuttle* disarm'd; the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Cologne* depriv'd of their Dominions; the Rebellion of *Hungary* almost extinguish'd; and all *Germany* now at leisure to pursue the common Interest. Besides this, a Part even of *Spain* it-self has revolted, a new War has been kindled in that Country; which, tho more easily supply'd on the part of *France* than of the Allies, has been hitherto carry'd on with pretty equal Advantage on both sides. But what is yet more than all the rest of our Successes, the *French King* is beaten out of the *Spanish Netherlands*; his old Frontier, fortify'd with so must Cost, and so long held impregnable, in so few years wrested from him; the Way in a manner laid quite open into his own Kingdom, and himself at last reduc'd to the unhappy Choice of either losing *France*, or yielding up the Kingdom of *Spain*.

So many Armys beaten! Such successful Sieges! Such vast Countrys recover'd! What wou'd any Man have ask'd more of Almighty God in so short a time? Or how cou'd the most sanguine Person have expected half so much? It is plain that Providence must have fought on our side; and yet something is to be attributed to the Wisdom of that Administration, which was bless'd with such unparalleled Prosperity.

The *French King* himself seems almost stupify'd with his Losses: He has been brought twice to sue for Peace; but at the same time he sues for *Spain* and all her *Indian Treasures*, and wou'd still keep back the very Thing we have been so long fighting to recover. The *Torys* are melted with his Tears; they are for complying with his Petition; and wou'd fain persuade us, we may safely give him *Spain* for a Peace.

This



This is still more astonishing than all the rest, since by this Concession the *French King* without fighting wou'd in a few years be enabled to recover all that has been taken from him, and indeed to bring all *Europe* under his Dominion.

I persuade my self, a Person of your excellent Understanding cannot want Arguments to set you right in this matter: and I know your Authority will be very great with all those of your Party, whenever you shall think it necessary to lead them out of their present Error. The Design therefore of this Letter, is to offer as convincing Arguments as I am able, to shew that such a Peace as they so earnestly desire, wou'd be more ruinous to themselves and their Country, than the present War; that at least if they will leap into the Gulf, they may do it with their Eyes open.

The Method I shall take to do this, shall be, by endeavouring to shew the following Particulars; viz. That giving *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, will be giving it to the *French King*; That the latter will be enabled by this Gift to increase his own Security, Riches, and Power; and to distress, impoverish, and weaken all his Neighbours: That *Portugal*, *Brazile*, *Peru* and *Mexico* will soon be oblig'd to submit to the *French Dominion*: That we shall be utterly depriv'd of all the most valuable Branches of our Trade: That we shall have no Income or Supplies of Money by any Trade, or from any Country whatsoever; That we shall lose the annual Income of three Millions and a half, which is gain'd to the Kingdom by Trade even during the present War, and the Assurance of gaining a much greater Revenue by wresting *Spain* from the House of *Bourbon*: That as we shall gain nothing if the Duke of *Anjou* shou'd be settled upon the *Spanish Throne*, so we shall export or lose at least half a Million yearly till our whole Stock is wasted: That consequently Peace on the Terms so much desir'd, wou'd be worse than the present War by the yearly Sum of one Million, and worse than depriving the Duke of *Anjou* of that Kingdom by the yearly Sum of four Millions: That by such a Peace we shall lose Employment and Subsistence for one Million of Souls, or a sixth or seventh Part of our whole People: And lastly, That we shall lose three Fourths of the annual and total Value of all our Lands. I firmly believe our Losses wou'd be greater in every Article than what I have mention'd; but these will be sufficient: and if I shall be able to prove they will be as great as I have asserted, I persuade my self there is not an honest

nest Man in *Great Britain*, who wou'd be pleas'd to accept a Peace upon such Terms, as the *French King* has hitherto thought fit to offer it. And yet the Administration has been traduc'd and vilify'd for not accepting such a Peace.

That giving Spain
by a Peace
to the D. of
Anjou, is
giving it
to the
French
King.

I begin with the first thing I propos'd to prove, viz. That to give *Spain* by a Peace to the Duke of *Anjou*, wou'd be the same thing as to give it to the *French King*.

Indeed we have Politicians who pretend otherwise. They say the Duke of *Anjou* will in a little time become a perfect *Spaniard*; That Princes naturally aim at being Sovereign and Independent; That they easily forget all Tyes of Blood and other Obligations; That Gratitude is the Vertue of private Persons, and seldom or never practis'd betwixt Sovereign Princes. And these Politicks they endeavour to fortify by the Example of the Dukes of *Burgundy*, a younger Branch of the Royal Family of *France*: Yet never have there been more implacable Wars than betwixt those Familys, which were not at length extinguish'd but with the Life of the last Duke of *Burgundy*.

By this Argument these Gentlemen wou'd have dissuaded us from going into this War at first, when all the *Spanish Towns* in *Italy* and the *Netherlands* were garison'd by *France*. And now since all these Places are wrested out of their hands at so vast an Expence of Blood and Treasure by the Allies, the same Patriots make use of the very same Argument to persuade us to give up *Spain* to the *French King*, by which after a short breathing space he will be enabled to recover all the rest of that Monarchy, and indeed to bring all *Europe* under his Dominion.

For they know very well that to give *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, is to give it to the *French King*. No doubt the former wou'd very gladly be a Sovereign, but it will never be in his power to throw off his Dependance upon *France*. And the Example of the Dukes of *Burgundy* is nothing to the purpose.

It is very true, the first of those Dukes took *Burgundy* as his Apanage from the Crown of *France*. But then by the Convenience of his Situation in the Neighbourhood of *Germany*, he cou'd easily confederate himself with the *German Princes*; he cou'd at any time draw Assistance from them sufficient to defend him against the most powerful Efforts of that Crown; he cou'd have subsisted as the little Republick of *Geneva* does at this day against *Switzerland*, *France*, and the Dukes of *Savoy*, by the mutual Jealousy of those States. But the Case of the Duke of *Anjou*

is very different: The Kingdom of *Spain* lies too remote to receive Succours from us or our Allies, as we have sadly experienc'd in the whole Course of the present War; while on the other hand it lies always open to an Invasion from *France*, and there is no manner of Proportion betwixt the Strength of both Kingdoms.

A nearer Parallel therefore may be found to the present Case, in the Memoirs of *P. de Comines*, an Author of undoubted Credit, and well acquainted with the *Burgundian Wars*. A younger Brother of *Lewis* the XIth had the Choice given him of the Dutchy of *Guienne*, which is surrounded by *France*; or the County of *Champagne*, which lies upon the Confines of the *Netherlands*, for his Apanage. He was advis'd by *Charles* of *Burgundy* to accept the latter, that he might be always at hand to assist him against the Insults of his Brother. But the young Prince imprudently chose the Dutchy of *Guienne*, where, indeed with a greater Title, he liv'd altogether at the Mercy of *Lewis*, and was by him shortly after remov'd from that Dutchy to a yet greater Title and less Power.

But whatever Opposition the Dukes of *Burgundy* might have made to *France*, it is certain they made none while they were only possess'd of that Dutchy; so long they remain'd in a State of perfect Vassalage and Dependence. Indeed when afterwards, by Marriage or Inheritance, they became Masters of all the *Netherlands*, Countrys at that time, in the Judgment of *P. de Comines*, little or not at all inferior in Strength and Riches to the whole Kingdom of *France*; it is no wonder if the Emulation, which is so natural between Sovereign and Neighbouring Princes, broke out into Hostilities, and if the Dukes of *Burgundy* disclaim'd all manner of Subjection to the *French Kings*, to whom indeed they were Equal. But this can never be the Case of the Duke of *Anjou* upon the Throne of *Spain*, a Country which lies always open to an Invasion, too remote to receive Assistance; and which by comparison of the Efforts, that for the space of forty years past have been made by both Kingdoms, can hardly be thought equivalent in Strength to one tenth part of *France*. The Duke of *Anjou* therefore may with more justice be compar'd to a Duke of *Guienne*, or any other mere Subject of the *French King*, than to those Sovereign Princes of the House of *Burgundy*.

But if there is so great a Disproportion between the Forces of both Kingdoms, it will be ask'd, What reason can be given why an *Austrian Prince* shou'd not live in *Spain*, as much at the Discretion of the *French King* as
his

his own Grandson? The Answer is ready: The Emperor, the Dutch, the States of the Empire, and We (if we are not wanting to our selves) shall be unanimous to support the former. And the Experience of the present War has convinc'd the *French King*, that he will then have too much Work upon his hands to be at leisure for conquering. Now this Reason must needs cease, if the Duke of *Anjou* were upon that Throne. The House of *Austria* has had an Interest in preserving the *Spanish* Succession to it self; but when that Succession shall be once gone, will any Prince of that Family concern himself in the Quarrels of the House of *Bourbon*? Certainly no more than in those of the *Sophy* and *Mogul*. Besides, the *French King* will not be able to attack an *Austrian* Prince upon the *Spanish* Throne, without carrying on a War at the same time against the *Spanish Netherlands*; and then the Danger is too near the *Dutch* not to interest them in the Quarrel. But so long as the *Netherlands* shall be quiet, the common People of *Holland*, and consequently their Rulers, will not easily be engag'd in a War for preserving *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*. And no Man in his Wits can think we shall undertake such a War by our selves, when we shall be once forsaken by the States and the Emperor. And thus *France* will be at leisure to give Law to the Duke of *Anjou*, and to govern *Spain* at Discretion.

This the *French King* knows very well, and therefore with all his Losses he is not yet humbled into Peace. Now can it be believ'd that he has sacrific'd the Lives of so many thousand Subjects, impoverish'd his whole Country, lost his best fortify'd Towns, plung'd himself into a Debt, which without *Spain* or a Sponge he will never be able to discharge; and that he has done and suffer'd all this, only that the Duke of *Anjou* may be a Sovereign? Can it be thought the Grandfather has made himself Bankrupt, and his Heirs after him for ever, only that a younger Grandson may be independent, and chuse whether he will make him any Satisfaction for so great an Obligation? Is the Duke of * *Burgundy* to inherit a Debt of a hundred Millions Sterling, only that his younger Brother

* By this it appears these Sheets were written before the Death of the late Emperor and Dauphin; It is now pretended that the Election of King Charles to the Imperial Dignity has made so great an Alteration in the Ballance of Power, that 'twou'd be safer for

Brother may be always able to defy him? These are such Absurdities as will not pass upon the meanest Understanding; and tho' very little can be said for the Honesty of the French King, he was never thought a Fool. But as the Acquisition of Spain has been the Pursuit of his whole Reign, it is now become necessary for his Affairs, that he may get the Spanish Indies, those Fountains of Money, under his Dominion. By this he is to repair his Losses, satisfy the Debts of his Crown, restore publick Credit, and re-establish the Trade and Manufactures of his People. Hence proceeds that Unwillingness to part with Spain, that invincible Patience under so many Defeats, that Deafness to the Cries and Prayers of his poor Subjects, those insidious and delusive Treatys to divide the Allies, to get himself out of the War, and to leave us to recover Spain as we can, which he will be sure to make impracticable. That famous Saying of his, at his seizing the Spanish Monarchy, will never be forgotten, *viz.* That hereafter France and Spain shall be as One; that is, he shall govern both as his own. Whatever our Politicians may think, these are so many Arguments that he means nothing else than to unite the two Kingdoms.

But besides the Superiority of his Forces, by which he will be enabl'd, and the Necessity of his Affairs, by which he will be oblig'd to keep the Duke of Anjou in a State of Subjection and Dependance, he has his Garisons in the best fortify'd Places of Spain, under the Command of his own Officers. This must very much facilitate the Work, and keep the Spaniards to their good Behaviour; This will direct all the Views and Applications of the Nobles and Grandees to the French Court; and as for the common People, since their Cortez or Parliaments have been laid aside, they are no more to be regarded than so many Women and Children. All the Preferments of Spain will be given at the Court of France. The Duke of Anjou will per-

for us to leave Spain and the West-Indies to the Duke of Anjou, than to truit the Emperor with the whole Spanish Monarchy. These Sheets demonstrate, that to give Spain to the Duke of Anjou will be our Ruin. The Imperial Dignity gives no Dominions to the Emperor; and 'tis certain, for half a Century, both the Spanish and German Dominions of the House of Austria, under several Heads, have not been equal to France alone. How then will they become superior, when united under one and the same Head?

haps

haps be suffer'd for a time to live with the Pomp and Splendor of a Court, but the real Government will remain in *France*; at *Madrid* will be seen the Shadow of a King, whilst the Substance is at *Versailles*.

I believe when all these things are consider'd, I shall be thought to have prov'd, that to give up *Spain* by a Peace to the Duke of *Anjou*, is to give it the *French King*; that the latter will have the whole Government of that Kingdom, and will rule it as his own.

That the
Fr.K. will
govern
Spain so
as shall
best in-
crease his
own Secu-
rity, &c.
1. Secu-
rity.

That is, he will govern *Spain* in such a manner as shall best conduce to increase the Security, Riches and Power of his own Dominions, and most effectually distress, impoverish and weaken all his Neighbours.

First, For his Security. He will be in no danger of any Invasion from *Spain*, if he can assure himself of the Fidelity of the *Spaniards*; and for this he will (as he has done in the *Netherlands*) erect and maintain Citadels in their great Towns, at the Charge of the Inhabitants. By these he will be able to suppress the first Motions of every Insurrection or Sedition. And we may depend upon it, that no cost will be spar'd to improve the Fortifications of † *Cadiz*, not only for that reason, but because it is the Key of all their *Indian Riches*. This therefore he will be sure

† To obviate this Inconvenience, I must here observe, that Abel Roper, and other Mercenary Scriblers wou'd amuse us with a Project of a Peace, by which *Cadiz* is to be left in our Hands, garison'd by our Forces: and some unwary People are taken with this Expedient. But tho *Cadiz* wou'd continue to be the Key of all those *Indian Riches* while in the hands of the *French*, who will remain posselt of all their other Ports; yet will it be so too, in the Hands of the *English*, who will be posselt of none of the other *Spanish Places*? In this last Case will not the *Spaniards* chuse rather to make their Outlets from *Vigo*, *Corunna*, or any other Seaport Town, and receive their Returns at the same; and shall we be able to hinder them? Can *Cadiz* to us be worth the Charge of a standing Army, and 500,000 l. per ann: to maintain it? Or shall we be able at so great a Distance, in spite of Wind and Weather, to defend it, whensoever the *French King* shall resolve with the united Forces of both Kingdoms to retake it? Will it not be in the Power of *France* to retake it in a Month, and shall we be able to relieve it in a Twelvemonth? Can there be any other Meaning in this, than that *France* shou'd buy *Cadiz* hereafter, as she did *Dunkirk* heretofore? Is not this such another

sure to keep in his own hands, the better to assure himself of the Fidelity of the People. There will be no fear of their revolting from a Prince, who has the Custody of their Riches; since we are taught by the best Authority that ever was, that where the Treasure is, there also will be the Heart. But to make any Revolt impracticable, there will be plac'd every where *French* Garisons, under the Command of *French* Officers.

However; to make amends to the *Grandeess* and other *Noblemen* for the Loss of these Employments, their Sons and younger Brothers will be invited into *France*, to take Commands upon the *Rhine* and in the *Netherlands*; and these will be so many honourable Hostages for the Fidelity of their whole Familys. This was usually practis'd by the old *Romans*, with good Success; and the same Cause must needs produce the same Effect in every other Government.

When in this manner sufficient Caution and Security shall be taken of the great Familys, there cannot be the least reason to apprehend any Danger from the common People. These poor Wretches will have only chang'd their Master; they were miserable before, and can but remain so under the Government of *France*; they may think they have a Chance at least to have their Servitude made lighter. And what Reason is there then to believe they will be discontented at the Change? Are they in danger of suffering Persecution for Conscience-sake from a Prince of their own Religion, and as Catholick as themselves? Are they likely to be more burden'd with Taxes for the Defence of their Country, when *France* shall become their Friend, or rather a part of the same Country, and is so happily interpos'd by her Situation between *Spain* and other Enemys? But to remove all possible ground of Discontent: Why should we not believe that, the *French*

ther senseless Project as Forts in the South-Sea? Can these Places be of the same Importance in our Hands as in the *French*, who will be left in Possession of both the *Spains*? And if we could retain those Places, shou'd we be able to compel the *Spaniards* to trade with us, any more than the *French* King wou'd be able to compel *England* to trade with his own Subjects, by having a Garrison in *Portsmouth*? It is plain then these Fellows, instead of Substance, treat us only with whipt Syllabub: They mean only to burden us with a present Charge, of which we shall soon grow weary. But 'tis happy for us they are not Ministers of State.

C

King,

King, to provide the better for the Subsistence of the People, will promote and encourage their Manufactures, as much as shall be practicable, in so desolate a Country, and so thinly inhabited ?

It is indeed the Policy of all wise Governors, and conduces very much to their own Security, to prevent the Complaints and Murmurings of the People, by helping every one to suitable Employments, and especially by enabling the Poor to subsist by their own Labour. For this end they carefully preserve and keep at home the first Materials and Foundations of all considerable Manufactures. This is the Reason of our many severe Laws to hinder the carrying Wool and Fulling Earth out of *England* : and for the same Reason so many foreign Manufactures are either prohibited with us, or loaded with such Dutys as amount to Prohibitions ; whilst the raw Silks of *Aleppo*, and the unwrought Wools of *Spain*, are admitted upon easy Terms to furnish Work for our People. And why shou'd it be thought that the *French* King will not pursue the same Maxims which the wisest Governors have practis'd in other Nations, and which he himself has always practis'd in his own ? Why shou'd not he, with as much reason as our Princes, prohibit the Exportation of Wool from his Dominions, and take as effectual Care to be obey'd ? The Consequence of this must be, that all the *Spanish* Wool will come to be wrought up in *Spain* and *France*, and no other Country be let in for any Share. Our Gentlemen fondly flatter themselves, that *English* Wool and *English* Earth are necessary Ingredients in the finest *Spanish* Cloth ; but every *Wiltshire* Clothier is able to inform them otherwise. And how shou'd *Holland* come at either ? And yet they equal any other Place both in the Quantity and Quality of this noble Manufacture. If then the *French* King shall be left to govern *Spain* as his own, he will, for the better employing his People, keep all the *Spanish* Wool within his own Dominions ; at least he will never endure that his own Subjects shou'd sit still and starve, and that the Mony of his Countrys shou'd be carry'd out to purchase the Labour of other People.

2. *Riches.* For, *Secondly*, It is the Policy of all wise Governors, by all possible ways, to enrich their own Subjects, from whom they can always take at discretion as much as shall be necessary for their Occasions. The Political Laws and Institutions of all Nations are adapted to this end ; they all encourage the bringing in of Bullion, and discourage the carrying any out. They suffer their own Manufactures to

go out free, and will not permit those of other Countrys to be imported without excessive Dutys ; they endeavour to enrich their own Subjects by the Consumption of foreign People, rather than Foreigners by the Consumption of their own Subjects. Such is always the Conduct of wise States, with relation to foreign Trade, whilst all Manufactures and other Goods are sold and exchange'd free between Subjects of the same Sovereign ; as the Sales of Goods betwixt *London* and *Wiltshire* are without Customs or Dutys. I shall beg leave therefore, in the first place, to observe a difference between *France* and *Spain*, and then shew what use the *French King* will make of these Rules and Maxims in the Government of his united Kingdoms.

France abounds with native Commodities and Manufactures, not only sufficient for the use of her own People, but also to supply the Wants of very many of her Neighbours. There are no Mines of Gold or Silver in this Kingdom ; all their Money is imported from other Countrys, in exchange for their Manufactures. On the other hand, *Spain* has few Conveniences of Life, not enough for her own People, much less for her Subjects in *America* ; but then she draws such Supplies of Money from her Mines of *Peru* and *Mexico*, as are sufficient to procure all other Things. Thus the Bullion, which is every Year imported into *Spain*, is as often distributed among other *European* Nations ; and to this Fountain perhaps are owing nine tenth Parts of the current Coin of every Country.

Thus then the *French King* will apply the aforesaid Maxims to the Government of his united Kingdoms ; he will discharge all Customs upon all Goods imported from each Kingdom to the other, whilst all those imported from any other Country into either shall be loaded with excessive Dutys. There is no doubt but the *Spaniards* will rather buy cheap from the *French*, that is, from their Fellow Subjects, than pay a double Price for the Goods of other Countrys, one to the Foreign Merchant, and another to their own Prince. The Consequence is, The Bullion or Money, which flows every Year into *Spain*, will find its last Settlement in *France*, to the vast enriching of that Nation.

Lastly, The *French King's* Increase of Power is a necessary Consequence of the Increase of his Security and Riches. *Spain* heretofore has been a very troublesome Neighbour to *France* by her Native Strength ; and is still able, by her convenient Situation, and her Alliance with the Empire, *England*, and the *United Provinces*, to give her very great Disturbance. But if I have prov'd that by the

3. Power.

Accession of *Spain* to his Dominions, the *French King* will be able to make all things quiet there, it follows that he will be secure from any Invasion on that side; and the Armys, which he has usually imploy'd there, together with the Forces he will be always able to draw from thence, will make a great Addition to his Power against all his other Neighbours.

If I have also prov'd, that the Accession of this Kingdom will make a great Addition to his Riches; and if it is certain, that Money is the very Sinews of War, as that which hastens the Levys, clothes the Soldier, fortifies the Frontier, furnishes the Magazine, and prepares the Train of Artillery; then, without doubt, the Increase of his Power is a necessary Consequence of increasing the Riches of his Kingdom.

And so as
shall most
effectually
distress,

As the giving up *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou* makes so great an Addition to the Riches and Power of the *French King*, it must consequently enable him to distress, impoverish and weaken all his Neighbours.

But to consider this matter more particularly: By the convenient Situation of the Harbours of || *Cadiz* and *Gibraltar*, he will be always able to secure a Naval Force sufficient to distress, if not to command, the Entrance into the *Mediterranean*. There is no reason why he shou'd not chuse rather to lodg his whole Fleet at *Cadiz* than at *Toulon*. And what then shall hinder his establishing a Toll in the Straits, as the King of *Denmark* has done within the *Sound*? and a much more grievous Toll, as he will have more Power to maintain it? If this can be done, his own Subjects only will be suffer'd to pass free: all other Nations must either submit to the Imposition, or dispute it by their Convoys; the Merchant must trade as it were in Armour; either the Toll, or the Convoy, shall eat out the Profit of the Voyage. It is easy to be seen, that by such a Conduct so much of the *Mediterranean* Trade will be lost as depends upon that Passage; the two great Maritime Powers will be absolutely excluded, and the raw Silks of the *Levant* suffer'd to come no farther from Home than into the *French* Dominions.

If the *French King* can do this, if he can prohibit the Exportation of *Spanish* Wool from his own Countrys, if

|| *Cadiz*, as is shewn in the Notes before, tho it shou'd be given us by a Treaty, must soon come into the *French* Hands, and therfore that Argument need not be repeated now.

he

he can also prevent the Importation of Manufactures from the Countrys subject to the two Maritime Powers ; what prodigious Numbers of their Subjects must either mutiny for want of Employment, or starve for want of Bread ? And will not these Potentates be distress'd by so great a Charge of Subjects upon their hands, or by the Seditions of their People ? *

* The way to discover how great a Disturbance wou'd be made among our People, by the Loss of our Mediterranean Trade, were to consider the Numbers that are employ'd and subsisted by the several Branches of it ; for example, that of Turkey might be consider'd in the following manner : The last Outset for Turkey was above the Value of 700,000 l. and at least six seventh Parts of that value was the Price given for English Labour. Now as the Poor working People of both sexes, great and small, are annually subsisted for about six Pounds per Head at a Medium, it is plain, that an 100,000 People must have been subsisted a whole Year by the Preparation of that Outset. Again, our Returns from Turkey are generally raw Silks and Grogram Yarns : and that they may be sufficient to answer the Cost of the Outset, the Freight, Insurance and Customs, the Commission, and other Charges, and at last a reasonable Profit to the Merchant, I shou'd think they ought to be of the Value of at least a Million and a half. The next Enquiry therefore shou'd be, how much Labour is bestow'd upon these Returns ; and for this I have had the Curiosity to weigh a Pound of the cheapest Manufactur'd Silk, which yet was of three times the Price that was given for it raw, when it was first sold at the English Market. If the Returns are, as I have fancy'd, of the Value of one Million and a half ; and if they generally increase to treble their Value by the English Manufacture ; and if they employ as many cheap hands in Proportion as the Outset, it wou'd follow, that three Millions or five times 600,000 l. given for the Manufacture of the Returns, must employ five times as many People as the Outset. A Turkey Fleet is fitted out but once every two Years, yet even so upon the former Supposition 300,000 People are annually employ'd by that Trade, and consequently by the Loss of it must be depriv'd of their annual Subsistence, and must come to the Parish for a Maintenance. But if this Loss shou'd be thought too great for the Turkey Trade only, I shou'd think it cou'd not be less for that of the whole Mediterranean ; which, by our Argument, wou'd be all lost, by leaving Spain to the D. of Anjou : And wou'd not our Government be distress'd to provide for such a Number of new Poor ?

Again,

Impove-
rish,

Again, it is certain both *England* and *Holland* must part with great Quantities of Bullion, or Money, every Year for Naval Stores, and other Necessaries: and if this Loss is not to be supply'd from *Spain*, or other Countries (as will be shewn hereafter, if *Spain* shall be given up) then our Poverty is inevitable.

But, to make the quicker Dispatch of our Riches, *France* her self will take a great deal off our Hands; that Prince will allow his Subjects to sell us Wines, Fashions, and Luxury, and we shall be sure to have them a great Pennyworth. Tho it wou'd seem strange that our Gentlemen, so famous for *Ostober*, shou'd all on a sudden become so enamour'd of *French* Wines, as to desert their *English* Manufacture; that they shou'd be so eager to enrich the Vinedressers of our Enemies, and to impoverish their own Tenants: for it cannot be imagin'd that Gentlemen wou'd do this for a safer Way of holding Correspondence with *France*, and paying an annual Tribute to *St. Germans*. But 'tis needless to pursue this Argument any farther, since nothing can be more evident, than that the *French* King, by adding *Spain* to his other Dominions, must impoverish his Neighbours.

And wou'd
he his
Neighbors.

What a bright Figure then shall we make in *Europe*? What noble Efforts against the Great, the Rich, the Powerful King of *France*? What wonderful Armies shall we not be able to raise from among our own People, when they shall be destitute of all other Employment, and starving for want of Bread? It is no matter for Clothes or Pay, Arms or Ammunition; these things we shall find among our Enemies: We shall I warrant, with the greatest Courage and Intrepidity, rush on naked against an armed Prince for the Plunder of his Country. No certainly, we shall understand our selves a great deal better; if we are not able to keep this Prince down when we have him under, if we shall suffer him to raise himself again upon our Ruins, we must hereafter contract our Schemes, and become humble Supplicants to his most Christian Majesty to have some Compassion of our Miserys. Doubtless, in his good Nature, he will condescend so far to our Prayers, as to grant us a Viceroy and a new Religion. And this perhaps is the Reason why some Persons are so much in haste for a Peace, and for giving *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*; they know very well we shall be reduced to all this Poverty and Weakness, and they wou'd fain have the Viceroy and the Religion upon any Terms whatsoever.

But

But tho our Ruin must come on apace, 'twill fall to the King of *Portugal*'s Share to be dispatch'd first. That Prince is unhappily situated, at too great a distance from his Allies, to expect any seasonable Succours from them; and without large Assistance from *France*, has always been so unable to resist the single Attacks of *Spain*, when she had no other Work upon her Hands, that 'tis not likely he should now withstand the united Powers of both Kingdoms.

To give Spain to the Fr. King, is also to give him Portugal;

Portugal was heretofore conquer'd in the short space of seventy days by *Philip* the Second of *Spain*; and without doubt will be oblig'd to submit to a much superior Strength, in less time than is usually employ'd in the Sieges of great Cities.

This Conquest then will easily be made, and as easily retain'd. The *French* King will assure himself of the Fidelity of this Province, by the same Arts and Methods as of that of *Spain*. He will make use of the like Policy in both Countrys, to increase his own Riches, and to impoverish all his Neighbours. He will either prohibit or burden the Manufactures of other Nations, in such a manner, that it shall be the Interest of *Portugal* to buy only those of his Subjects. And hence all their yearly Supplies of Money from *Brazil* will be carry'd into *France*, whilst no other Nation will be let in for any share of those Riches.

Thus those vast Colonys of *Peru*, *Mexico* and *Brazil*, which have hitherto furnish'd the current Coin and all the Bullion in *Europe*, will be oblig'd hereafter to work their Mines for the sole Benefit of the *French* King and his Subjects. This I think is not to be avoided, unless those Colonys shall separate themselves from the Jurisdiction of their Mother-Countrys, and lay open their Ports to the Merchants of all Nations; or unless the two Maritime Powers shall be able to possess themselves of their Mines, or to intercept their Gallions.

As also *Peru*, *Mexico*, and *Brazil*, with their Mines.

But if we shall leave *Spain* and *Portugal* at the Mercy of the *French* King, what reason have we to imagine that their *American* Colonys will not follow the Fate of their Mother-Countrys, and remain subject to the same Power? Was not *Brazil* always under the Jurisdiction of *Spain* during the Servitude of *Portugal*? And did not this Country and their Colony both revolt at the same time? And have not all our own Plantations gone hand in hand with *England* thro all the Changes of our Government? Indeed all Colonys are so closely link'd with their Mother-Countrys, and by so many Endearments, that those of

Spain

Spain and Portugal do not give us the least hopes of a voluntary Separation.

And if they will not separate of themselves, shall we be able to compel them? Shall we undertake the Conquest of those vast Countrys? Or how else is it that we are to become Masters of all their Mines? Have we sufficiently consider'd the great distance of *America*, the prodigious Extent of those Colonys, the Preparations necessary to reduce them, the Charge of transporting Forces, Artillery and Magazines, to Countrys, which abound indeed with Silver, and want almost all other Necessaries of Life? If we wou'd but duly consider any one of these things, we shou'd soon be convinc'd that such a Conquest is impracticable. Again, if to this we wou'd add the Unhealthiness of those Climates, especially to New-comers, and the Devastations they have made in *Spain and Portugal*, by drawing off vast Numbers of their People, we shou'd soon abandon all Thoughts of so romantick an Expedition.

So that the only thing left for us is to intercept their Plate-Fleets; but how few of those Ships have been taken by their Enemys since the first Discovery of *America*? They have no narrow Straits to pass, nor we to lie in wait; they have the whole Ocean to range in, and so great a Latitude to escape us, that the few Prizes which may happen to be taken will not answer one tenth part of the Charge of the Fleets which shall be fitted out for that Service. * Those

* As it seems impossible for these Reasons to get any Money from *Peru, Mexico or Brazil*, either by a direct Trade with those Countrys, or by a Conquest of the People, or by intercepting their Plate-Fleets; our new Politicians wou'd suggest to us another Expedient, by which the Spaniards shall be disabled to hinder us from having our Share of that Money. They wou'd have us accept of certain Forts in the South-Sea, by which, say they, those Colonys will be oblig'd to trade with us; and then we need be in no Pain for Old Spain, when by this means we shall be enabled to import their Bullion from the first Spring. The Lord help their Heads! for certainly these Gentlemen are got beyond the reach of Medicines. Wou'd they have us undertake the Defence of Forts at such a Distance? Are we to send Arms and Soldiers, Ammunition and Provision, a Voyage of twenty Months into a Country of Enemys? Will it not be always easy for the Spaniards to retake them, and will it be ever possible for us to relieve them? But if in spite of the French and Spaniards, we cou'd keep them, shou'd

Those Countrys then must remain all alike under the Jurisdiction of the French King, who will undoubtedly regulate their Commerce in such a manner, that no part of their Riches shall be diverted from his own Subjects. This is the Practice of all wise States in their own Colonys; Quebec and Martineco are thus administer'd by France, and so are our West-Indies and the Northern Continent of America by England. Our Act of Navigation has disabled all Strangers to carry off their Sugars or Tobaccos, which are the Staples of those Provinces. And we, no doubt, shall be so narrowly watch'd hereafter, that it will no longer be in our Power to sell Negroes to the Spaniards; France will undertake that whole Work herself, and we shall consequently be depriv'd of the only Branch of our Trade, which makes any Returns of Bullion into England.

I presume I have sufficiently prov'd, that to give up Spain to the Duke of Anjou, is to give it to the French King; and not only to give him Spain, but Portugal too, all the Spanish and Portuguese Indies, a great part of our Trade to Africa, and our whole into the Mediterranean. We are no longer to expect either Wool from Spain, or Silk from the Levant; we shall for ever be depriv'd of those necessary means for the Employment of our People. And what is still worse, those Fountains of Mony, from whence we have drawn such constant Supplies, will be lost for ever to this Kingdom.

I proceed therefore, in the next place, to make some Estimate of those Losses. I believe it will then be evident, That by giving up Spain we shall pay very dear for

show'd we be able to force the People who are in possession of the Mines, to trade with us? Are they not at a Distance of many hundred Leagues? And have they no nearer Ways into Europe, than by those Ports? And lastly, if we cou'd carry on an immediate Trade to those Places, yet were it not a great deal better for us, to sell them Manufactures by the Way of Old Spain? Shou'd we not sell abundance more, and subsist greater Numbers of our People by clothing the Inhabitants of both Spains, than by trading to only one? But I fear I shall be thought as much besides my self, by dwelling so long upon this senseless Expedient, as the Gentlemen who have propos'd it. And yet perhaps they are not so much besides their Senses, they may have little Views of their own. They may be more in haste for a Peace, than their Country. They may find their own Account in such a Peace, but England must be ruin'd by it.

a Peace; That instead of getting rid of our Taxes, this is the ready way to increase them; and That the Charges of this Peace will be greater than even those of an everlasting War: of which, Thanks be to God, her Majesty's Arms have made too great an Impression upon *France*, to leave us under the least Apprehension.

1. Of an
Income of
Mony by
foreign
Trade.

The Losses then, which are the unavoidable Consequences of this Peace, are either of the yearly Incomes of Mony into this Kingdom, or of that which is already in our possession, or of the means of Subsistence for our common People, or of so much Value of our Lands.

To consider these in order: I begin with our Loss of Income of Mony by Foreign Trade, which, as I shall shew, will be three Millions and five hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum.

By yielding
Spain to
the Duke
of Anjou,
we shall lose
our whole
Income of
Mony from
Abroad.

To make out this, I offer only these two things.

First, That by yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, and its unhappy Consequences, we shall lose our whole Income of Mony from abroad.

Secondly, That our present annual Income by foreign Trade, is three Millions and a half. If these two things can be prov'd, our Loss will be, as I have affirm'd, 3,500,000 l. per Annum.

The former of my two Propositions, viz. that we shall lose our whole Income of Mony from abroad, will want but little Proof. For it is certain, we shall have no new Supplies of Bullion from *Peru*, *Mexico* or *Brazil*, those Fountains of all the Mony of *Europe*; since, as I have already shewn, the Commerce of those Places will hereafter be under such a Regulation, that no part of their Riches shall be diverted from the *French King* and his Subjects; since the Mines of those Countrys will be wrought hereafter for the sole Benefit of their new Masters, and the Mony which flows from thence, will find its last Settlement in *France*.

I shou'd be glad if my Reader wou'd inform me of any other Mines that are worth the Charge of Working; for my own part, I have heard of none, except these I have already mention'd, and those of *Africa*. From these last indeed, we receive some small Parcels of gold Dust; but not enough for the Trimmings of our Clothes. I believe, all that has ever been imported thence, in any one Year, wou'd hardly have answer'd the Charge of any one Ship that has been fitted out thither, if we had had no Market for the Negroes which we also purchas'd in that Country. And we shou'd lose all those Markets for the future; since,

as

as I have already shewn, we shou'd be able to sell no more Negroes to the *Spanish Indies*; and since, as I shall shew hereafter, there wou'd be no want of any more in our own Plantations. Thus we shall have no Income of Money by our Trade to *Africa*.

We shall have none from the *Mediterranean*. That Trade for the most part is carry'd on without Money, only by the Exchange of our Manufactures, for raw Silks and other Goods, which furnish a vast Employment for our People. But if any Ballance is coming thence in Money, it must be all lost by yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*; since, as I have shewn before, we shall be depriv'd of our whole Commerce with those Countrys.

We shall have no Money from our own Plantations, since they have no Mines of their own; and they will be no longer able to gain any Bullion from the *Spanish Indies*, for the Reasons already given.

We shall have none from the *East Indies*, since Labour is a great deal cheaper there than it is in *Europe*; for which Reason we are forc'd, for the carrying on this Trade, to send our Bullion thither: and therefore, after the Loss of all our Income, we must abandon our Trade with those Countrys, to save the little Money which will be left.

We shall have no Money from the *East Countrys*; they want few of our Manufactures, and we shall always want their Naval Stores.

We shall have none from *Spain* or *Portugal*; which, as I have prov'd before, will by the yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, remain subject to the *French King*, and with their Returns from *Peru*, *Mexico* and *Brazil*, must purchase all their Necessarys from *France*: it will therefore be made their Interest to buy none of us or any other Country.

We shall have no Money from *France*: That Prince has so effectually prohibited our Manufactures, and encourag'd our Luxury, that we have always lost by that Trade. And in Fact, *France* gain'd from us in the Reigns of *Charles II.* and *James II.* more than a Million Sterling *per Annum*. This was agreeable to the Policy of those Princes, who rais'd that Country so high, that it shou'd not be in the Power of all the rest of *Europe* to pull her down.

Besides the Places I have mention'd, I know of no other with which we have any Commerce, or from which it can be thought we import any Bullion, except the *Netherlands*, *Hamborough* and *Germany*. These People have no Mines, no Gold or Silver of their own Growth; they must acquire all by their foreign Trade, before they can spare us any.

And 'tis certain, we must expect none from them, if there shall be no Possibility of their gaining any by their other Commerce. But of this there will be no Possibility, if all the Mines of *Pern*, *Mexico* and *Brazil*, shall be brought under a *French* Regulation. For *Holland* and *Germany*, as well as *England*, have all their Bullion either directly or indirectly from those Mines. And if these hereafter shall be wrought for the only Benefit of the *French* King, and his Subjects; if those Fountains of Money shall all flow into the *French* Dominions, and stagnate for ever there; then it must follow, that we shall all alike be depriv'd of any new Supplies; that we must all alike live as long as we shall be able upon our present Stocks, which therefore we must preserve and husband to the best Advantage. Consequently our Commerce with *Germany*, and the *Netherlands*, must be very much contracted; no more Trade with us will be allow'd by those Countrys, than what can be reciprocally carry'd on and manag'd on both sides by the Exchange of Goods for Goods, of Manufactures for Manufactures: we shall not be permitted to sell them an Overplus, by which we may be entitled to a Ballance of Money from those Places. And therefore, whatever our Income is from the *Netherlands*, *Hamborough* and *Germany*, it will be lost for ever to this Kingdom. Thus I think, by taking a View of all the known and valuable Mines in the World, and of all the Places with which we have any the least Commerce; and by having shewn, that after yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, we can hereafter have no Money from any one of those Places; my first Proposition is prov'd, viz. That by the Loss of *Spain*, and its unhappy Consequences, we shall lose our whole Income of Money from abroad.

And how great that Loss is like to be, will appear by my second Proposition, by which I have affirm'd, That our present Income by Trade, is 3,500,000 *l. per Annum*. And I can by no means believe, that I have exceeded in the Sum.

For the *East-Country* by Naval Stores, and the *East-Indies* by their Manufactures, draw not much less than a * *Mil-lion* from us every year; and during the present War there goes

* For most People will allow, that about 500,000 *l. per Annum*, is exported to the *East-Indies*; yet many deny that above half that Sum is sent to the *East-Country*. But then they are ready

goes out more than double that Sum to maintain our Armys Abroad, and to pay the Subsidys to the Princes in our Alliance: To say nothing of those Quantities of Gold and Silver that are consum'd in the Clothes and Ornaments of People of Condition.

Now 'tis certain, we have no other Supplies than from *Spain, Portugal*, and their *American* Colonys, or other Countrys which are furnish'd by them, except some small Parcels of Gold-Dust from *Guinea*, not enough for the Trimmings of our Clothes, as has been said before; and if those Supplies are not sufficient to answer our Expences, our Decay must needs be sensible. If our annual Expences shou'd have exceeded our Income in only one Million, we shou'd have been long since ended by a Consumption; a War of almost Twenty Years Continuance must have exhausted every Shilling out of the Kingdom.

But, on the contrary, we flourish more than ever in the Splendor of our Equipages, in the Magnificence of our Buildings, in the Furniture of our Houses. More Plate is seen in private Familys, tho so much has been call'd in and melted down by Authority. And to compleat the Demonstration, no Fund of great Advantage is offer'd, which is not fill'd in four and twenty hours.

Perhaps it may be objected, that the Case may be the same with a Nation as with a private Gentleman; the Gentleman may exceed in the Splendor of his Living, whilst his Debts and Interest eat him out: in like manner, we may be indebted to foreign Nations for all our glittering Appearances. And it must be confess'd that even Foreigners have given us Credit upon our Funds to the Value of Four or Five Millions, which, in order as they become due, we shall be oblig'd to repay with Interest.

Now to this I answer, in the first place, That the Decay of the Gentleman in that Case is visible: he runs over Head and Ears in Debt, till he is torn to pieces by his Creditors; whilst *England* goes on with all this Splendor, without any fear of Danger from foreign Nations. Tho we have so great annual Payments to make Abroad, the

ready to own, that what I have exceeded to the East-Country, I have fallen short of the Foreign War. And if upon any account whatsoever, three Millions per Annum are exported, the present Argument will stand good. Be that as it will, not above one tenth Part of the Argument will fail, nor of the Consequences that depend upon it.

Course

Course of Exchange is generally in our Favour ; which is but another manner of expressing, That to save the Charge of transporting Mony, Foreigners give more for the Payment of their Debts in *England*, than the *English* for the Payment of theirs Abroad. It will follow then, that more becomes annually due to *England* from Abroad, than from *England* to foreign Nations, and consequently more than the three Millions, which is annually paid to the *East-Country*, to the *East-Indies*, and to the foreign War. And this Debt can no otherwise become due to us, than by the Ballance of our Trade.

For, Secondly, I answer, It is not the Mony which Foreigners lend at Interest upon our Funds, which makes the Course of Exchange in our Favour. This Debt to Foreigners, which is suppos'd to be Four or Five Millions, has been twenty Years contracting, and if equally distributed into years, wou'd be inconsiderable for any one : And 'tis certain, that the Credit given by our own People in this whole time, is four or five times of that value. And since we have not mortgag'd our Lands to Foreigners to make these voluntary Contributions to the Government ; and since also it appears by our Customhouse Entries, that our Stock in Trade is not less at this time than it was before the Revolution*, it is manifest that all this Mony lent by our own Countrymen to the Publick, has since that time been acquir'd and imported into *England*. The Credit then which is given by our own People upon the publick Funds, is not only sufficient to ballance that of Foreigners, but also to demonstrate that we import at least Five Hundred Thousand Pounds *per Annum* more than is paid Abroad by *England*, even during the present War, upon any pretence whatsoever ; or if three Millions are exported, yet at least three Millions and a Half are return'd upon the Ballance of all our Trades, which was the thing I undertook to prove.

Which will I have been more tedious than I wou'd have been in arguing this matter ; and therefore I must beseech you not be all lost . to forget the very End of my Argument, which was to by yielding shew how much Income of Mony we shall lose by the Cession of Spain to the Duke of *Anjou*, and its unhappy Consequences. I think I had prov'd before, that in consequence

* I think it is the Observation of some Gentlemen, that much Richer Fleets are arriv'd this very Year, than ever were known in any one Year either in War or Peace.

of that Cession we must lose all our Supplies or Incomes of Money upon the Ballance of our Trade: and if I have just now prov'd that our present annual Income of Money from our Trade is three Millions and a half, or five hundred thousand Pounds *per Annum*, over and above our Payments to the War and other foreign Expences; the Consequence is clear, That all this Income will be lost: and thus we shall give more for our Peace, than one third part of all the Rents in *England*.

If by Peace, and the Duke of *Anjou* upon the *Spanish* Throne, our Condition will be so much worse with respect to our Income of Money than during the present War; how much more will it be so, than if it shou'd please God to restore Peace to us, and *Spain* to the House of *Austria*? In this last Case all those Payments to the War, or the annual Expence of two Millions will be sav'd, and consequently so much of our annual Income. And then as no new Funds will be created to divert the Subjects Money to their own, not the Nation's Profit, some part of these two Millions will be laid out every year in Land, and increase the Value of Purchases; but the greatest part will be added to our Capital Stock in Trade, to the farther great Increase of our annual Income from abroad. And 'tis reasonable to imagine that the Restitution of *Spain*, with a full Trade to that and all other Countrys, will still add a Million to our Income. Then it evidently follows, that by Peace and King *Charles* upon the *Spanish* Throne, our annual Income of Money from abroad, will be four Millions and a half, whereas our annual Expences to the *East-Country* and the *East-Indies* will not exceed one; that is to say, our Income or Ballance will be three Millions and a half, clear of all foreign Payments and Disbursements, all which will be lost by giving *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*: for by that we shall have no more Money from abroad.

But if we are to buy our Peace upon this wretched Condition, our Loss of Income will not be all; our present Stock of Money must consume apace. Great Quantities of Bullion must either be sent to other Countrys, or wasted at home: but how much, and by what means, is in the next place to be consider'd.

First then it is confess'd we shall save all those Payments to the War, and to the Princes in our Alliance. Indeed such vast Expences, and no Supplies, wou'd make an end of us all at once.

In the next place, it is probable we shall entirely prohibit the *East-India* Trade, which will prevent the Exportation

The Restitution of Spain to the House of Austria wou'd make our Income of Money by all our Trades 3 Millions and a half over and above all Expences.

By giving Spain to the D. of A. we shall lose of our present Stock

500,000l. per ann.

tion of about five hundred thousand Pounds *per Annum*. For tho I believe that Trade has been hitherto very beneficial, and the Cause of importing more Money into *England* than any other; yet when we can no longer expect any new Supplies, we shall never endure a Trade by which our whole present Stock of Money must be exhausted.

Our *Eastland* Trade for Naval Stores is thought at this time to take off about as much as that of the *East-Indies*: But we shall not export so much hereafter, since we shall not want so great a quantity of Naval Stores after our Loss of so many other Trades. We shall want none for our *East-India* Fleets, since for the reason just now given we shall abandon that Trade of our selves: We shall want none for the *Mediterranean*, since I have prov'd before, that all that Trade will be taken from us: We shall want none for so much of our Sugars and Tobaccos as we have usually sold to our Neighbours for Money; that is, for at least one half of our *West-India* Trade, since no more Money can be imported: We shall want none for so much of our *African* Fleets as were only Carriers to the *Spaniards*, since I have shewn that all that Work will be taken out of our hands by the *French*: And lastly, we shall want none for the rest of our *African* Trade, since we shall lose our foreign Markets for Sugars and Tobaccos; and the Negroes already living upon our Plantations, are more than sufficient to supply our own People. It is probable we shall save in these Articles the Expence of three hundred thousand Pounds, which is usually exported to purchase Naval Stores, if that shall be thought a Benefit*.

All the Naval Stores then we shall want, will be for our Colliers, our Coasters, and so many of our Fleets as are employ'd in importing Goods from our Plantations for our own Use, or in exchanging Goods for Goods with our Neighbours; for which perhaps we shall be oblig'd to export two hundred thousand Pounds *per Annum*. Tho I be-

* Some Gentlemen are of Opinion, that not above 200,000 l. *per Annum*, is now exported to the East Countrys; if they are in the Right, our Argument will only vary in this, that instead of 200,000 l. only half that Sum will hereafter be exported upon this Account, after the Loss of so many of our other Trades. Which will make no great Difference in the present Argument; and I believe, that more than the Sum of 100,000 l. which wou'd be sav'd in this Article, wou'd be annually increas'd to our Luxury and Foreign Expences.

lieve in this case it were better for us to repeal our Act of Navigation, and to let our Neighbours be the Carriers, by which even this Expence wou'd be also sav'd.

Besides this, I do not know of any other Quantities of Gold or Silver we shall be oblig'd to part with, except what shall either be carry'd into *France*, or wasted here in *England*. Our Gentlemen have such refin'd Palates, that they are not able to live without *French* Wines; and we shou'd lose all the Splendor of our Theatres, if but one single O-
rice were wanting in the Circle. I believe it is but just to add to the former Account three hundred thousand Pounds *per Annum* upon these Articles. But if five hundred thousand Pounds *per Annum*, or even less Sums, are to be lost, and no way to be repair'd, our Gentlemen will be glad in a few years to return again to their *Oslober*, when it shall be too late to save themselves or their Country; and our Ladys instead of shining in Tissue or Cloth of Gold, must be forc'd to work for a Living in home-spun *English* Kersey, like true *English* Housewives.

I think nothing need be added to this Argument of Money, but only like the Merchants to cast up the Ballance at the foot of the Account, which is as follows.

During the present War our annual Income is three Millions and a half,	}	500,000 l. per Ann.
our annual Expence three Millions;		
so that our Income exceeds our Expence in the Sum of _____		

But if it shall please God to restore us Peace by placing King Charles upon the Throne of Spain,	}	3,500,000 l. per Ann.
our Income will be four Millions and a half, our Expence about one;		
so that our Income will exceed our Expence in the Sum of _____		

Now by Peace, with the Duke of Anjou upon that Throne, our Income will be nothing, and our Expence —	}	500,000 l. per Ann.
So that this last Peace is worse even than the present War in the Sum of _____		

And worse than recovering Spain to the House of Austria, by the Sum of _____	}	4,000,000 l. per Ann.
of _____		

If any Man thinks we shall ballance so great a Loss by our Returns from the *South-Sea*, I must declare my self one

of those sanguine Persons who hope for very good Effects from that Trade. Yet I am perswaded we shall not give up *Spain* with a certain yearly income of so many Millions *Sterling*, before the Experiment shall be made, whether a Trade can be carry'd on in the *South-Sea* in spite of the *French* and *Spanish* Nations, or what Sums of Money may be annually expected from it. If I were the greatest Minister that ever was in *England*, I shou'd not be the Adviser of such a Peace, for fear of being torn in pieces by the People, when their Feeling shall have restor'd them to their other Senses.

The Loss of an Income by Trade of 3 Millions, is the Loss of Subsistence for 300,000 People. For our first Loss of our whole Income of Money from abroad, will go a great way in proving our second, viz. The Loss of Employment and Subsistence for our People. I think it is sufficiently prov'd that our annual Gain or Income upon the Ballance of our Trades with *Spain*, *Portugal*, *Holland*, and the *Spanish Indies*, is three Millions and a half.

Now what is all this but the Price given for the Value of Corn, Manufactures, Sugars, Tobaccos, *East-India* and other Goods exported from *England* to those Countrys? But if no more Money shall hereafter be return'd, must we not for ever lose our Markets for so many of those Goods? Will not the Gentleman lose so much of his Share of that Money as is now paid him in his Rents? Must not the Merchant lose his Gains, the Labourer his Hire, upon all those Exportations? Therefore to distinguish and separate these things; to shew how much of those three Millions and a half is the Price or Reward of mere *English* Labour, is the Medium or Argument to shew how many of our People must lose their Employment or Subsistence by the Loss of so many of our foreign Markets.

Of all the Corn which is exported, the Gentleman has a considerable Share, and not a little must be allow'd for the Farmers and the Merchants Gains. Yet when the Ploughman, the Seedsman, the Reaper, the Thresher, the Carrier, the Smith, the Carpenter, the Seaman, and innumerable other Persons shall all be paid for the Labour which they have bestow'd upon it; there is just reason to believe that four parts in five of the Price given in a foreign Market, is the Price of *English* Labour.

Our Woollen Manufactures which are carry'd to those Markets, are generally of the finest sorts, and the double Value of all our other Exportations. But the Shares of the Gentleman and Farmer are only the Value of the Wool, which perhaps is not above 6 *d.* per pound, after the

the Shepherd is paid his Wages, whilst the same in Manufacture shall be more than twenty times that Value. The Merchant so near home will hardly expect more than a twentieth part of the Value for his Gains; and consequently nine parts in ten of the whole Price, is the Price of *English* Labour.

The Sugars and Tobacco's of our Plantations, are the Purchase of our Manufactures, and chiefly those of Woollen; and when the Merchants Gains upon so many of these Goods as are exported shall be deducted, at least four parts in five of the Price which is return'd, is the Price of *English* Labour.

Lastly, our *East-India* Goods are sold to our Neighbour Nations at ten times as great a Price as is given for them in the *East-Indies*; and if it shall be consider'd in how great a length of Time, and from what distance of Place they are carry'd to those Markets, at least 20 *per Cent.* or one fifth part of the last Value must be allow'd for the Merchants Gains: and if these with the first Cost shall be deducted, yet more than three Fifths of their last Value are upon the account of *English* Labour.

Our Woollen Manufactures do so much exceed all our other Exportations, and the Value of Labour in the former is so much more than six seventh parts of the whole, that tho' it shou'd fall short in other Goods, yet the Price of Labour at a Medium in all our Exportations, will at the least amount to six seventh Parts of the whole; and consequently if by yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, we shall lose our Markets for our Goods to the Value of three Millions and a half, as is prov'd before, we shall lose our Markets for *English* Labour of six seventh Parts of that Price, or of the Value of three Millions.

I think it evidently follows, that we shall lose Employment and Subsistence for so many of our People as are annually maintain'd at the Charge of three Millions; and how great that number is, is next to be enquir'd.

Sir *William Petty*, comprehending all sorts of People from the Prince to the Parish Poor, affirms that the whole Mass are annually maintain'd at the Charge of seven Pounds *per Head* at a Medium: but I make no doubt if Gentlemen, Merchants, considerable Traders and their Familys shall be distinguish'd and separated from the poor Labourers, their Wives and Children, all this latter sort are yearly subsisted for six Pound a Head at a Medium. Now there being five hundred thousand times this Sum in three Millions of Money, it follows that five hundred thousand of our People will be depriv'd of their Employ-

ment and Subsistence by the Cession of *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*; and in consequence of that, by the Loss of our foreign Markets for *English* Labour of that Value.

The Loss of our domestic Trade as great. This we shall lose by so great an Abatement of our foreign Exportations. But our Loss will be as great by the Diminution of our Manufactures, which are made for the Consumption of our own People.

By the want of Spanish Wool:

In the first place, we shall have no more *Wool* from *Spain*, for the reason that has been already given. To which nothing more need be added, than that the *French* King has just now shewn his Authority in *Spain*, by prohibiting all manner of Commerce betwixt the *Dutch* and the *Spaniards*; on purpose to increase the Impatience of the former for a Peace, by the want of that *Wool* to employ their People. Indeed he seems of late to be in much better humour with *England*; perhaps he believes he has better Friends among us. But if a Peace shall once leave *Spain* in his power, all that *Wool* will be then engross'd by *France*. It is easy to see that the greatest part of *Wiltshire*, and some other places, will be depriv'd of their Subsistence by the Loss of that noble Manufacture.

Of Raw Silk from Persia and the Levant:

Again, So much of our *Spanish* Cloth as is not us'd at home, is exported to *Persia* and the *Levant* for the raw Silks of those Places; another great Foundation for the Employment of our People. We shall have no more of that Cloth to export; but we need not be in any great pain for this, since for the reasons before-mention'd we shall be depriv'd of our whole Trade to the * *Levant*, and shall of our selves abandon that of the *East-Indies*. So for the time to come we shall be able to procure none of those Silks for either Money or Manufacture. Thousands of Looms must stand still upon this account, and almost numberless Throwers, Spinners, and other People, Men, Women, and Children, that work to every Loom.

By degenerating into coarser Manufactures,

But tho' those Silks could be still procur'd, our very Poverty would oblige us to content our selves with a coarser sort of Manufactures, and we shou'd be utterly disabl'd to purchase the finest of our own Growth. And if for our own Consumption we must change our Stuffs for Kerseys, even this way great numbers of People will be depriv'd of their Subsistence, since the greatest Numbers are employ'd by the finest Manufactures. This is as certain, as that it is less Labour to spin two hundred Yards from a Pound of *Wool* than two thousand, one thousand from a

* 'Tis noted before, that the Loss of the *Levant* or *Turkey* Trade only, wou'd deprive 2 or 300,000 People of their annual Subsistence.
Pound

Pound of Silk than ten thousand, and ten thousand from a Pound of Flax than thrice as great a length.

Lastly, Besides that we shall be reduc'd to greater Plainness and Simplicity of Dress, the same Poverty will oblige us to be better Husbands of our Clothes. We shall no longer leave them off because they are out of fashion, but because they are worn out. 'Tis certain very great Numbers are now constantly employ'd to furnish these Supplies to our Luxury. *And growing better Husbands of our Clothes;*

'Tis not very easy to adjust the particular Value of every one of these Losses; but I believe any Man's Reason will suggest to him that the Loss of so much of our Trade at home must necessarily deprive as great Numbers of their Employment and Subsistence, as the Loss of * that abroad. And thus a Million of Souls, a sixth or seventh part of our whole People, must either starve or live at the Charge of all the rest.

And yet this will not be our whole Increase of Poor: *And by the* Many of our Merchants and considerable Traders, who *Ruin of our* labour very little themselves, but derive great Gains from *more considerable* buying and selling the Labour of other People, will by *Traders.* the Loss of so many of their Markets both at home and abroad, instead of contributing large Sums to the Publick by Customs or otherwise, become themselves a part of the Publick Charge; instead of flourishing with Coach and Equipage, are very likely to come upon the Poors Books, and increase the Parish-Rates.

For my own part then, I shall no longer wonder that *The Examiner*, and such other Writers, are so full of their *miner* Investives against Trade and a Trading Interest, as if the *and some* Interest of the Nation were no way concern'd in the *Clergymen* Preservation of Trade. As for these Men, I consider them *against* as so many second-hand Hirelings to carry on the Interest *Trade, and* of France. But 'tis wonderful to read such things in the *for what* Writings of some of our Reverend Divines, to find them *Reasons.* also inveighing against Trade, as if it were the Cause of all the Schisms and Heresys in the World; and recommending the old Patriarchal ways of Cowkeeping and Agriculture as more innocent Employments for the People.

Wou'd they have us increase in the things, when we have already so much more of them than are sufficient for our People? when we abound so much in Cattle, that we will not suffer any more to be imported upon us by our

* Especially since by the Loss of the Turkey Trade only, it is noted before we shou'd lose Employment for 2 or 300,000 People.
fellow

fellow Subjects? and in Corn, that we give Bountys to our Neighbours to take it off our Hands?

But are Bread and Meat the only Necessaries of Life? Are not Clothes and Manufactures as necessary to our Well-being? Or shall they who have the whole Property of the Lands make Clothes for themselves? And shall not the rest of the People be able to buy Bread and Meat in Exchange for their Manufactures?

Or what do these Reverend Persons mean? Wou'd they have us naked, that they may clothe us? hungry, that they may feed us? Tho their Charity is very great, it can never be equal to the Wants of such Multitudes.

It is still less to be imagin'd, that they wou'd first make us poor, that they may afterwards make us Orthodox. They know very well that extreme Poverty is as great a Temptation to Sin as too much Riches; and that starving our Bodys is not the way to save our Souls.

And 'tis yet less to be suspected that holy Men, without any secular Ends, who are separated from the World, and dedicated to God's Altar, shou'd ever intend the Impoverishment of the People, the better to assure themselves of their Subjection; that they shou'd have any Design so wicked as the establishing their own Dominion upon the Ruin of their Country.

But whosoever the Person is, whether of the Clergy or the Laity, of whatsoever Quality or Degree, and for whatsoever Reasons or Pretences, that shou'd go about to deprive the Nation of so great a part of their Trade, so great a part of the People of their daily Bread, such a Man wou'd surely be impeach'd of the highest Crime and Misdemeanor by the general Voice of the Kingdom. There cannot be the least fear that the common People, against whom so much Mischief is intended, wou'd be guilty of any Riot or Insurrection, to prevent the doing Justice upon such an Offender.

And 'tis yet less to be conceiv'd that Gentlemen, Ladies, and Persons of superior Quality, shou'd take part with such a Criminal, and conspire to do him Honour; since their Sufferings will be yet greater than those of the Common People by so great a Loss of Trade. Gentlemen are therefore more nearly concern'd to prevent the yielding up of *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, whence this and all the other Consequences I have mention'd are unavoidable.

For, in the first Place, do they imagine, that by the Loss of so many Markets for our Corn, Manufactures, and other things, their Rents will not be affected? Or is

it possible they shou'd not be affected? These things that *By the Loss* are annually parted, and sold from the Farm, are not *of Spain,* mere Labour, but Labour mixt with the Produce of the *and so* Lands; and therefore if the Produce of the Lands shall *much of* continue still the same, and the Purchasers shall be fewer, *our Trade,* the Rent or Value of the Estate must needs be abated. *Gentlemen*

This must make a sensible Diminution of the Rents, *must lose* but by that which follows they must tumble down apace. *3. Parts of* 'Tis certain we shall be oblig'd, as is prov'd before, to if- *4. the Value* sue annually great Sums of Money out of *England;* and if *of their* by giving up *Spain* we shall be disabled to import any fresh *whole* Supplies, it must follow, that in the Space of not very ma- *Estates.* ny Years, the whole Kingdom will be exhausted, and there will not be sufficient Money left to answer the Rents of any one Gentleman's Estate. This must needs lessen the Value of the Estate, unless it shall be affirm'd that the Produce of the Lands will remain as valuable after the Loss of all our Money, and as little burden'd to the Gentleman.

But how shou'd the Produce of the Land be as valuable without Money? Will the Barter or Exchange of Goods be as easy and commodious? Will it furnish the Gentleman with as many Conveniences of Life? The very Supposition is ridiculous, and to put it only is to expose it.

Again, after what has been said, how is it possible the Estate shou'd be as little burden'd? Only so much of the Profits of the Estate are coming to the Gentleman, as are not paid away to Publick or Parish Taxes. But if all publick Taxes shou'd cease, how much must those to the Parish be increas'd, by such a Burden of new poor as I have describ'd? They will have no whither to fly, but to the Lands for a Maintenance; A Million of new poor will hardly be subsisted for less than five Pounds per Head, or the whole Number for less than five Millions per Annum. And how much less is this than ten Shillings in the Pound, or half the full Value of all the Rents in *England?* And 'tis probable, that more than half of what remains will be lost, with so many Markers for our Goods, and by the want of Money to facilitate our Exchanges. And if three Fourths of the annual Value of the Estate shall be lost, the Estate must needs fall three Fourths of the Value in the Purchase.

Gentlemen will hardly believe that so great a Fall is possible. But if they will please to consult an excellent Book, call'd, *The Account of Denmark,* they will find there, that Estates sell three Fourths of their Value in the Purchase, and that few Purchasers were to be found even

upon those Terms: And all this only by the Change of their Government, from a Limited to an Absolute Monarchy; or in other words, from a Prince that was bound to govern according to Laws, to one that was not to be resisted upon any Pretence whatsoever. And if we will but put *Spain* under the Power of *France*, we too in the Space of a few Years shall be reduc'd to such Poverty and Weakness, as to change our Limited for an Absolute Monarchy, not the Absolute Monarchy of a Prince of our own Growth, but of a *French* Man, a Papist, and a Tyrant.

I hope these Gentlemen have kept very exact Accounts of their Debts, and have very well consider'd how small a Part of their Estates will be sufficient for their own use; for if their Debts shou'd happen to be equal to a fourth Part of the present Value of their whole Estates, then, by the Loss of three Fourths of that Value, and by satisfying their Creditors with the remaining fourth Part, there will remain nothing for themselves. And thus they who are so weary of paying Four Shillings in the Pound to the War, will, by giving up *Spain*, give their whole Estates for a Peace.

Nothing is more miserable than to fall from a Life of Luxury and Ease. Happy had it been for these Gentlemen if they had always liv'd by their daily Labour; the Grievance wou'd be less, when they come to the Parish for Subsistence. But how wretched will the Condition be of those gay Ladys, who sparkle every afternoon in the Ring? or blaze every Night in the Boxes? How will those soft Hands be made to work? How will those Complexions agree with Morning-Air? And yet very Hunger will not let them sleep. But lastly, what will become of the Race of the finest Fox-hunters in the World? They may e'en feed their Dogs with their Horses; and when they have done, they may hang up all their Dogs. It will be no time for Sports and Diversions, when they shall be entertain'd every where with Scenes of Horrour; when they shall be no where able to turn their Eyes, without seeing the Ruin and Desolation of their Country, and yet shall be no where able to see more miserable Creatures than themselves.

And yet we have pretended Patriots, that wou'd rather see all these things, than lose sight of the Pretender, or expect the House of *Hanover*. These perhaps may fondly imagine, they shall sell their Country dear, and obtain advantageous Terms for themselves. But how well soever the *Pierce* King may love their Treason, he cannot fail to hate the Traitors.

In the Estimate I have made of the Losses which this Kingdom will suffer by yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, I do not believe I have reach'd the full Value of any one Loss. It is sufficient for my purpose if I have demonstrated, that not any one of our Losses can be less, than is set down in this Estimate.

It is not then to be wonder'd at if the Parliament, about three years since, address'd her Majesty not to consent to a Peace, without the entire Restitution of *Spain* to the House of *Austria*; so many wise Heads in that Parliament cou'd not but foresee, that the Consequences of yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou* wou'd be, as I have prov'd,

1. The Loss of Three Millions and a Half of annual Income by foreign Trade; a Sum which more than ballances all our foreign Expences even during the present War.

2. The annual Expence of Half a Million, without any Income of Money by our foreign Markets.

3. The Loss of Employment and Subsistence for at least a Million of Souls, a sixth or seventh part of the whole People.

4. and Lastly, The Reduction of all Estates to one fourth part of their present Value, to the utter Impoverishment of all the Landholders in *Great Britain*. These certainly were sufficient Reasons for that Address, and those noble Persons who advis'd it, deserve eternal Thanks from their Country.

What then shall be thought of those Wretches, who have the Confidence to tell us, that this was a monstrous step in *miner a-Politicks*? A Proceeding which, to People Abroad, must look like the highest strain of Temerity, Folly and Gasconage; a desperate, unprecedented Counsel, to gratify the unmeasurable Appetites of a few Leaders; to pin down the War upon us; to multiply Difficulties on the Queen and Kingdom. What shall be thought of those Miscreants, who have dar'd to offer a Comparison between the Parliament which made this Address, and that which began the Rebellion against King *Charles* the First, voted his Trial, and appointed his Murderers?

Yet this is the Language of the *Examiner* of Thursday, April 26. Numb. 39. But because I wou'd not wrong him, I shall transcribe his very words, which are as follows: ' And here we cannot refuse the late M——y their due Praises, who foreseeing a Storm, provided for their own Safety, by two admirable Expedients, by which with great Prudence, they have escap'd the Punishments due to pernicious Counsels and corrupt Management. The first was to procure, under pretences hardly specious, a General Act

of Indemnity, which cuts off all Impeachments. The second was yet more refin'd: Suppose, for Instance, a Counsel is to be pursu'd, which is necessary to carry on the dangerous Designs of a prevailing Party, to preserve them in Power, to gratify the unmeasurable Appetites of a few Leaders, Civil and Military, tho by hazarding the Ruin of the whole Nation: This Counsel, desperate in it self, unprecedented in the Nature of it, they procure a Majority to form into an Address, which makes it look like the Sense of the Nation. Under that Shelter they carry on their Work, and lie secure against After-reckonings.

I must be so free to tell my Meaning in this, that among other Things, I understand it of the Address made to the Q^{ueen}— about three Years ago, to desire that Her Majesty would not consent to a Peace, without the entire Restitution of S^{pain}. A Proceeding, which to People Abroad, must look like the highest Strain of Temerity, Folly, and Gasconade. But we at Home, who allow the Promoters of that Advice to be no Fools, can easily comprehend the Depth and Mystery of it. They were assur'd by this means to pin down the War upon us, consequently to encrease their own Power and Wealth, and multiply Difficulties on the Q^{ueen}— and Kingdom, till they had fix'd their Party too firmly to be shaken, whenever they shou'd find themselves dispos'd to reverse their Address, and give us leave to wish for a Peace.

If any Man entertains a more favourable Opinion of this monstrous Step in Politicks; I wou'd ask him what we must do, in case we find it impossible to recover *Spain*? Those among the *Whigs* who believe a GOD, will confess, that the Events of War lie in his Hands; and the rest of them, who acknowledge no such Power, will allow, that *Fortune* hath too great a share in the good or ill Success of Military Actions, to let a wise Man reason upon them, as if they were entirely in his Power. If Providence shall think fit to refuse Success to our Arms, with how ill a Grace, with what Shame and Confusion, shall we be oblig'd to recant that precipitate Address, unless the World will be so charitable to consider, that Parliaments among us differ as much as Princes, and that by the fatal Conjunction of many unhappy Circumstances, it is very possible for our Island to be represented sometimes by those who have the least Pretensions to it? So little Truth or Justice there is in what some pretend to advance, that the Actions of former Senates ought always to be treated with Respect by the latter; that those Assemblies are all
equally

equally venerable, and no one to be prefer'd before another: By which Argument, the Parliament that began the Rebellion against K. Charles the First, voted his Trial, and appointed his Murderers, ought to be remembered with Respect.

Thus far the *Examiner*: And now I must take leave to reason a little with this wonderful Statesman; only first I must beseech you to remember I have already prov'd, That during the present War greater Quantities of Bullion are gain'd and imported into *England*, than are carry'd out upon any Pretence whatsoever; That on the contrary, by Peace, and the Duke of *Anjou* on the *Spanish* Throne, great Quantities will every year be carry'd out, and none will be imported; That vast Multitudes of People, who now subsist by their own Labour, must then live at the Charge of the Landholders, and that consequently the Estates of these Men will be more severely tax'd to such a Peace than to the present War.

Is then the Ruin of the whole Nation hazarded by those Leaders, who have every year torn a Limb from the formidable Enemy of *Europe*, and are now stabbing him at the Heart? And wou'd not the Ruin of the Gentlemen, the common People, and the whole Kingdom be unavoidable, if *Spain* shou'd be left in his Power by a Peace? Was it not fit then for the great Council of the Nation, to address the Sovereign to continue the War, which (thanks be to Almighty God) does not ruin the Kingdom, and which every Year brings us so much nearer to our wish'd for Happiness and Security? Was it not fit to advise her Majesty against the making a Peace, which, in a little time, must prove the utter Ruin and Desolation of all her Countrys? Where then was this desperate Counsel; this unprecedented Proceeding; this monstrous Step in Politicks; this high Strain of Temerity, Folly and Gasconade? Was there any bold undertaking for the Providence of God in this Address? Was it any thing else but the Choice of Hopes by a War, rather than of certain Ruin by a Peace? What a Monster then must this prostitute Writer appear, who has had the Impudence to compare the Parliament which presented this Address, and to whose timely Supplies we are, by God's Blessing, indebted for great part of our Successes, to that Rabble of Men, who voted the Trial of King Charles the First, and appointed his Murderers?

' If Providence, says this able Statesman, shall think fit to refuse Success to our Arms, with how ill a Grace, with what Shame and Confusion shall we be oblig'd to recant that precipitate Address?' I answer, if Providence shou'd

hearken to the Prayers of such Wretches, and visit us for our Sins, with as ill Success as they desire; we must however put our Trust in God, we must still fight on; a War for the Recovery of *Spain*, cannot be so ruinous as a Peace, by which it shall be given up to the House of *Bourbon*.

Behold now this applauded Writer of your Party! This Weekly Director of the whole Kingdom! What Tenderness he has for the poor People, who are so grievously burden'd to carry on the War! This excellent Patriot wou'd have the Gentlemen give their whole Estates, the Labourers their Hire, and the whole Kingdom her foreign Revenue for a Peace. This he wou'd have done, that *Difficultys may not be multiply'd on the Queen and Kingdom*.

*The Invec-
tives of
the Exa-
miner and
his Fellow-
Scriblers
against the
late Mini-
stry.*

Yet this Author, his Correspondent, and his other Fellow-Scriblers, are the Men who are to set us right in Politics. They say, 'It is notorious we might have had a good Peace ever since the Battel of *Ramellies*; that from that time the War has been carry'd on to gratify the unmeasurable Appetites of a few Leaders; that *Spain* has been neglected to promote the Glory of a General in *Flanders*; that the Ministers have thought fit to borrow Money for every Year's Service upon the Credit of long Funds, and we have been oblig'd to mortgage Posterity to carry on a War for our selves; that God and Man were no longer able to endure the late Ministry, and it was high time for the Queen to make Choice of such a Set of Men, as wou'd restore us Peace and better Management.'

*For the
same things
are done
by the New.*

But now give me leave to ask these noble Patriots, if a good Peace might have been had ever since the Battel of *Ramellies*, why have not the New M——y procur'd it in all this time, since they have succeeded to the Powers of the Old? They know very well the *French King* has never yet consented to part with *Spain*, and that Peace without it wou'd be more ruinous than War.

Again, if our Leaders have been such Monsters, why have not the New M——rs advis'd her Majesty to part with them? Why is the Duke of *Marlborough* still continu'd? But they know there is not so great a Man as he, who has sav'd all *Germany*, recover'd all the *Netherlands*, and by drawing the greatest part of the *French Forces* upon himself, has enabled the Confederates to drive the rest out of *Italy*. For these reasons he is so justly esteem'd by the New M——rs as well as the Old, and will always deserve the Veneration of other Ages and other Countrys, how ungratefully soever he may be us'd in his own. He stood not in need of any ill Success in *Spain*, to render his Glory more conspicuous in *Flanders*.

Again,

Again, How has *Spain* been more neglected by the Old M——rs than the New? What Supplies have been sent thither since the Battels of *Almenara* and *Saragossa*? Yet God forbid that for this the New M——rs shou'd be blam'd: but the Experience of the present War, and especially the unfortunate Consequences of those Glorious Victories, have convinc'd Mankind that the Stress of the War is properly laid in *Flanders*, and that the way to recover *Spain*, is to pierce into the Heart of *France*.

Lastly, Why are the Old M——rs more blam'd than the New, for borrowing upon long Funds? for mortgaging Posterity to the Maintenance of the present War? Was ever more Money taken up in this manner in any one Year, than in the present? Indeed since the Parliament have never yet thought fit to lay the whole Charge of any one Year upon the Profits of the same Year, neither the Old M——rs nor the New are to be blam'd for taking the Money as the Parliament think fit to give it. And some perhaps will think that Posterity ought to bear some part of the Burden of the present War, as well as to share the Benefit of the Peace.

Behold then what noble Advocates these are for the New M——rs, who wou'd persuade us that neither God nor Man cou'd any longer endure the Old for those very things that are every day done by the New! Without doubt her Majesty had good reasons to make the Change, and every good Subject will acquiesce in her Pleasure. But without any derogation from the Old M——rs, the New are very justly to be applauded for endeavouring to raise publick Credit, which was so much sunk by the Change, and for their vigorous Application to the War for the Recovery of *Spain*, without which *England* must be ruin'd.

I have not, Sir, been offering these Arguments to a Man of your Judgment and Penetration, as if I thought you needed to be convinc'd of the Necessity of our going on still with the War; but rather in hopes to incline you to make use of the Authority you so justly have among the Clergy, the Gentry, and the common People of your Party, to persuade them that *Spain* must be recover'd, Trade must be preserv'd, or else every one will be undone. Your own Reason will suggest a multitude of Arguments to strengthen your Authority, and yet I flatter my self that this Letter will furnish some Hints which are not improper for this purpose.

To begin with the Clergy: I wou'd be understood only of those of your Party. If Lands shall fall three fourths in their Rents or yearly Value, will not the Glebe or

The New Ministers justly applauded, without any derogation from the Merits of the Old.

Expostulations with those of the Clergy who

are for giving Spain for Tithe a Peace.

Tithe of the Parson be reduc'd to the same Condition? And where is that Clergyman who wou'd give such a Part of his Living for a Peace?

Universal Poverty may possibly be the way to one Opinion in Religion: But where is that self-denying Minister of the Gospel, who wou'd give three Fourths of his Tithes to have all his People Orthodox, to have no Heresy or Schism in his Parish?

They may perhaps imagine the same Poverty will make way for a more absolute Dominion of the Priesthood. But which of all those Priests wou'd give the greatest part of his Subsistence for more Power? Which of them wou'd desire to be the starving Ruler of a starving People?

If *Spain* shall be left in the Possession of the *French King* by a Peace, mere Poverty will soon bring *England* and all *Europe* under the *French* Dominion. And then will any Priest of the Church of *England* be able to live or rule in his own Parish, without changing his Religion? And is the Change to Popery so very easy?

We have seen Addresses for breaking a Parliament that impeach'd one of that Order for preaching Principles inconsistent with our present Establishment; but wou'd not all the Clergy address for the Punishment of such a Man as shou'd dare to inflame the People by his Sermons, to the Desire of a Peace that must impose Popery and Poverty upon the Kingdom? upon the Parson as well as the whole Parish?

Perhaps they may fondly flatter themselves that the *French King* will take nothing from them, and that he will even reward them for their Service. But is any thing more natural than for Princes, when vested with all the Power they desire, to forget the Instruments that brought them to it?

But if those of the Clergy might still be suffer'd to enjoy their Religion and Livings, and if even their Revenues and Power might be increas'd for their good Service; wou'd they be pleas'd to see Ruin and Desolation every where round about them? Wou'd they inflame their Followers to the Desire of a Peace, which must prove more destructive to them than the most cruel War? Wou'd they make use of their Authority and Interest in their several Parishes to ruin a Gentry, and a common People, who are so fondly, I had almost said blindly, devoted to them?

With the
Gentry who
are for do-
ing the
same thing.

But certainly the Gentry cannot always be so very blind; they must needs open their Eyes at so near an Approach of their own Danger. For can it be believ'd, that together with *Spain* they wou'd give away all their best Markets?

Markets? or that the Produce of the Lands wou'd be still as valuable after the Loss of those Markets?

Wou'd Gentlemen be pleas'd to see great Sums of Money exported every year, and no new Supplies return'd? To see a Million of poor People thrown upon their Estates, and scarce any part of the Profits left for their own Subsistence? To see three parts in four of the annual and total Value of every Estate in the Kingdom lost for ever by these Articles?

Wou'd the Gentleman who is out of debt be able to live as well upon one fourth Part of the Estate as the Whole? And he that is indebted in one fourth Part of the whole Value, be able to live as well, when the Whole shall be taken from him for the Satisfaction of his Creditors?

And how wou'd all these Gentlemen, their Ladys, their Sons and Daughters, relish the parting with their present Luxury and Pleasure, for a wretched Subsistence by Parish-Alms or hard Labour?

And yet all these things are unavoidable Consequences of yielding Spain to the Duke of Anjou.

I believe Gentlemen are weary of paying Four Shillings in the Pound to the War; but which of them wou'd not chuse to double his Taxes, rather than give his whole Estate for a Peace?

Some perhaps are not pleas'd with the Revolution, and less with the Protestant Succession, and the perpetual Breach which That has made upon the Hereditary Right of the Crown. Such perhaps may think that to wrest Spain from the House of Bourbon, is to disable France from imposing the Pretender upon these Kingdoms. But if the Loss of Spain will have such ill Consequences, what Gentleman wou'd give his Estate to have the Pretender for his King? or reduce himself to Beggary, to disappoint the House of Hanover?

If any one is so fond as to imagine he shall be well rewarded by France, and that at the least he shall make a saving Bargain for himself; yet wou'd he be so cruel to his Country? Wou'd he have no regard to those poor People that blindly follow his Authority?

But lastly, for the common People of England, they have *And lastly,* heretofore judg'd very well of their own Interest; how *with the* some they now to pin their Faith upon the Sir John, the *Common* Sir Thomas, or the Parson of the Parish? How is it that *People* they are all on a sudden become the blind Followers of a- *that are* ny Authority whatsoever? *impatient*

Wou'd the Farmers or Freeholders be pleas'd with that *for such a* Gentleman, who shou'd endeavour that their Malt or Wool *Peace.* might

might be left upon their hands? Yet this perhaps wou'd be the Consequence of importing *French Wines*, and lessening the Consumption of our Corn and Manufactures in *Portugal*; but this must needs be the Consequence of yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, and putting our whole Trade under the power of *France*.

Greater Numbers of our *Wiltshire* People are maintain'd by making *Spanish Cloth*, than cou'd possibly be subsisted in the meanest manner imaginable by the whole Rents of that Country. But if *Spain* shall be given up, all the *Spanish Wool* will be engross'd by *France*, and our Manufacturer must live upon the Landholder. And can it then be thought that either of them wou'd vote for such a P——t as shou'd be careless for the Recovery of *Spain*, or give that Kingdom for a Peace?

London, Canterbury, Norwich, and other populous Cities, support very great Numbers of their People by the Manufacture of Silks. I think I have prov'd that the Loss of *Spain* will be follow'd by that of our raw Silks: and then what numbers must be starv'd? Has not *London* alone seen an Insurrection of twenty thousand Weavers upon any sudden and temporary Scarcity of that Commodity? And what then are we to expect, when they shall all be depriv'd of it for ever?

Perhaps it may be thought we are out of danger of any future Insurrection of the common People for their Bread, or for any other cause, unless for the Defence of Passive-Obedience and Non-Resistance. But tho they wou'd not rise for want of Bread, yet wou'd they chuse such Men for their Representatives in P——t, as together with *Spain* wou'd abandon the Subsistence of so many People?

I think I have prov'd that our finest Manufactures employ the greatest Numbers, and that our very Poverty upon the Loss of *Spain* wou'd oblige us all to content our selves with the coarsest sorts. And what then will become of numberless Hands that are every where employ'd in the finest Manufactures for the Consumption of our own Country? How shall half a Million be subsisted, that will be reduc'd by all these Articles?

When they shall have lost so many Markets at home, will they still work on for those abroad? But how is this possible, when it is also prov'd that the Loss of *Spain* will be attended with the Loss of so many of our foreign Markets, and of Subsistence for half a Million of our People?

And can a sixth or seventh part of the whole Nation be reduc'd to the unhappy Necessity of living upon the rest, and will not the whole Kingdom be impoverish'd? Will

not

not the Misery be universal? And are not all these apparent Consequences of yielding *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*?

What then must all Mankind think of the *Examiner* and his Friends, who wou'd have us buy our Peace upon these Terms? What else can our Clergy, our Gentry, our common People think of such a Wretch, than that he is in the Interest of the Enemy?

But if such are the Consequences of the Peace which is recommended to us, who will not be for going on with the War? If the Loss of *Spain* will cause such universal Ruin, what Man is there, from the Lord to the Peasant, that wou'd not excise a fourth or fifth part of his Subsistence to recover it? Who wou'd not pay a fourth or fifth part of the Price of all he eats, or drinks, or wears, towards carrying on the War, rather than a bad Peace shou'd leave him neither Bread, nor Meat, nor Clothes, but at the Mercy of *France*?

But I forget what I am doing: An earnest Concern for the universal Safety and Welfare of my whole Country, has drawn me to exceed the Bounds of a Letter. It is time now to conclude, and to assure you that I am,

S I R,

Your very Humble Servant.

P O S T S C R I P T.

S I R,

Nov. 14. 1711.

THE Ballance of Power is become so much the Subject of Conversation, and takes up so much Room in the *Post-boy*, the *Review*, *The Reasons for putting an End to an expensive War*, and other Discourses of our modern Politicians, that I had once resolv'd to make it the whole Subject of a Postscript to this Letter.

But this Thought I have laid aside, since I have already shewn in this Letter, that the *French King*, with the Duke of *Anjou* upon the *Spanish Throne*, wou'd over-ballance all the other Powers of *Europe*; and not only this, but that the *Emperor*, with all his Hereditary Countrys, and the entire *Spanish Monarchy*, wou'd not yet be equal, much less superior, to *France* alone, is demonstrated in a little Pamphlet just publish'd, entituled, *The Ballance of Power, or a Comparison between the Strength of the Emperor and the French King*.

The Author of *Reasons for putting an End to the War*, is every where full of the formidable Power of the *Emperor*, and the Danger of leaving *Spain* in his Possession. This, with

G

with the Faults of the late M——y, he has display'd with equal Pomp of Words and Want of Argument. I will undertake for this Gentleman, that he shall never stick at any Thing. He shou'd formerly have inveigh'd against the Men now in Power, to get into a Place; and to keep himself in it, he shall now turn his Stile against his late Patrons. But if this Person was indeed prefer'd by the late M——rs, I shou'd not be able to say they were without a Fault.

A much greater Man is the Author of the *Review*. In his Performance of *Sept. 1st* he treats the very Suggestion that *Spain* is to be given up to the House of *Bourbon*, as the most insolent Affront to the present M——y, and the very same thing as charging them with an Intention to give up *England*. I wonder what Sovereign Medicine has been since apply'd to his Eyes, by how much Gold they have been rub'd; for in most of his *Reviews*, and his other Pamphlets from that day, he is for a Treaty of Partition; he sees no harm in leaving *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*, and will be contented with I know not what Stipulations of the *French King*. I am amaz'd how this Person durst offer such an Affront, as he once call'd it, to the present M——y; I hope he is fully assur'd that it will not be ill resented.

But the greatest of all these Authors is *Abel Roper*, at least by the help of good Journeymen. In every day's Paper he triumphs over the ruin'd Party: but this is nothing; he boldly insults the Emperor, and other Princes our Allies, who, Thanks be to God, are not yet ruin'd. In his *Post-Boy* of the 10th Instant, after some Indignitys offer'd to the Duke of *Savoy*, the King of *Portugal*, and even to the Queen her self, particularly where he calls the Pretender her Father's Son; he at last asks this Question, Whether before the War begun, every one of the Allies wou'd not then have sat down contented with what is now offer'd? For once I shall answer this great Statesman; If *Lewis* did not then, or does not now offer *Spain*, all the Allies, especially *England*, ought, for the reasons in this Letter, to fight till *Spain* shall be recover'd.

And till I shall see a good Answer to this Letter, and to the Pamphlet I have just mention'd, I shall never believe we can be safe, if we shou'd give *Spain* to the Duke of *Anjou*; or be in any manner of Danger, tho we shou'd recover the whole *Spanish Monarchy* for the Emperor.



l
t
t
p.
e
t
n
n
e
e
o
s
y
p-
i-
n-
a-
n
e-
ot

at
a-
o-
es
d.
ys
nd
lls
ef-
he
at
ef-
in,
ns

to
ve
in-
co-